Lebanese Shi'ite Survey: Shifting Loyalty Toward the State

A significant shift in sentiment is emerging within Lebanon's Shi'ite community, raising questions about the long-term grip of Hezbollah on its core demographic. New data suggests that a majority of these voters are now favoring the transfer of the group's military arsenal to the Lebanese state, a stance that contrasts sharply with the party's historical argument that its weapons are essential for national defense against Israel.

The results stem from a poll conducted by Statistics Lebanon in September, which surveyed 800 Shi'ite residents. The data, reported by Israel's KAN and the Lebanese site Kataeb.org, shows that 66.4% of respondents supported handing over Hezbollah's weapons to the state. In comparison, 29.6% preferred that the group retain its arms. This finding marks a notable departure from earlier assessments of community cohesion behind the militia.

Further details highlight a strong preference for state-centric decision-making. According to Kataeb.org, 71.1% of participants believed that decisions regarding war and peace should rest exclusively with the Lebanese government. Only 5.9% favored a larger role for Hezbollah's leadership in shaping the country's future. Confidence in the national military was also high, with 78.5% of respondents trusting the Lebanese Armed Forces. Additionally, 51.1% identified the army as the best institution to ensure long-term security, while just 16.5% selected Hezbollah for that role.

However, the picture of public opinion is not uniform. While 67.4% of respondents felt that Hezbollah had failed to meet its goals or achieved only some of them in the recent conflict with Israel, 42.1% expressed disappointment or anger about its leadership. Despite this criticism, 59.5% still maintained some level of trust in the group, including 37.1% who reported a great deal of trust. KAN analyst Roi Kais noted that the group's existing support networks and status continue to sustain its strength, provided no other entity fills the resulting vacuum.

The new findings stand in stark contrast to a survey conducted in May 2026 by Lebanon's Information International. That earlier poll, cited by researchers Orna Mizrahi and Moran Levanoni in an Institute for National Security Studies analysis, found that 87.5% of Shi'ite respondents opposed disarming Hezbollah, with only 7.9% supporting the transfer of weapons. The significant gap between the two datasets has led analysts to question whether differences in survey wording or agenda influenced the outcomes.

Mizrahi and Levanoni argued that Hezbollah's influence is deeply rooted in its social and economic networks, political power, and the historical marginalization of the Shi'ite population. They suggested that intimidation has often discouraged open dissent within the community. In their view, weakening the group would require a stronger Lebanese army, supported by Western and Gulf financial aid, allowing the state to replace the services the militia currently provides.

Local signs of wariness are also emerging. In the southern city of Tyre, property owners reportedly opposed opening a branch of Al-Qard Al-Hassan, a financial institution linked to Hezbollah, in their building due to fears it might be targeted in an Israeli strike. Such branches have been hit in previous conflicts. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has announced aid of up to $14,000 for eligible families in Beirut and its southern suburbs whose primary homes were destroyed, and up to $12,000 for those elsewhere.

The group has faced major military and leadership setbacks, including the killing of Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024. A new war that began in March 2026 caused heavy destruction in villages in southern Lebanon. Whether this growing discontent translates into political change will likely depend on whether the Lebanese state can deliver security, reconstruction, and economic opportunity to its citizens.